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This habilitation thesis consists of an introduction and nine chapters which 
comprehensively present my contribution to the research of tax havens and financial 
secrecy. Eight chapters have been previously published or are forthcoming as articles in 
the following academic journals: Economic Geography, Social Indicators Research, 
Development Policy Review (two chapters), Post-Communist Economies (two chapters), 
Applied Economics Letters, Journal of International Development (all indexed in the Web 
of Science). The final chapter is currently under consideration for publication in 
International Tax and Public Finance. The introduction briefly describes the common 
threads and conclusions of my habilitation thesis and provides a summary of the findings 
of each of the following chapters. 
As tax havens, financial secrecy and profit shifting constitute essential concepts used 
throughout my habilitation thesis, I shall briefly introduce them first. At the most general 
level, a country might be considered a tax haven if it provides benefits to foreign companies 
or individuals in the form of low tax burden, high financial secrecy or as a combination of 
the two factors or other conditions. Financial secrecy is the lack of financial transparency, 
ranging from a lack of corporate transparency to a lagging implementation of international 
standards and cooperation. Profit shifting constitutes the artificial reporting of profits in tax 
havens instead of in countries where economic activity in fact takes place. Profits are 
shifted to tax havens mainly by multinational enterprises (MNEs) without changing the 
locations of underlying economic activities and often in order to avoid taxes (tax avoidance 
generally being lawful, in contrast with illegal tax evasion). MNEs shift profit using three 
distinct channels: debt shifting, locating intangible assets and strategic transfer pricing. 
First, profits can be shifted through loans at high interest rates from one MNE unit located 
in a tax haven to another unit located elsewhere. Second, the subsidiaries of one MNE can 
pay another subsidiary in a tax haven for benefiting from intangible assets such as 
intellectual property located there. The third main profit shifting channel constitutes the 
artificial increase or decrease of the prices of goods or services being transferred between 
the individual parts of an MNE. Furthermore, all of the profit shifting mechanisms 
employed by MNEs to avoid tax also naturally influence government tax revenues. 
These are simplified explanations, since, as I specifically point out in selected chapters, 
defining these terms is not without complications. This is especially true of the term tax 




havens suffers from a lack of consistent definitions, agreement on which countries ought 
to be considered tax havens is far from universal. This issue is not new, e.g. a 1981 report 
by the United States Department of the Treasury found that no single objective test is 
capable of identifying a country as a tax haven (Gordon, 1981). Over time different 
classification alternatives to tax havens have been proposed, including the term offshore 
financial centre,  widely used in economic geography for some time (Maurer 2008), and 
the more recently proposed secrecy jurisdiction  (likewise explained in chapter 2). No 
alternative has proven good enough thus far and definition-related challenges continue to 
persist. It is therefore essential to clarify the preferred classification of tax havens in any 
research which chooses to utilize this term, as I have done in each of the following chapters. 
All chapters thus focus on tax havens, a topic which has been the focal point of my research 
since early 2009 when I began working on the first edition of the Financial Secrecy Index. 
The chapters also share a number of common characteristics, both in terms of methodology 
and with respect to research questions. For example, most include an important empirical 
component: while some use straightforward statistical tools, others rely on econometric 
methods. Several chapters (4–6) use detailed firm-level data, whereas others (8–10) use 
country-level data. Most of my habilitation thesis focuses either on developing countries 
(3, 7–10) or on the Czech Republic (4–6). Most chapters (4–10) discuss profit shifting by 
MNEs while also approximating its scale. Estimating the effects of tax havens on the 
government tax revenues of other countries forms the primary focus of the second half of 
the habilitation thesis (chapters 6–10). Most chapters provide policy recommendations and 
some of them also introduce indicators which may be used to track the impact of policy 
changes over time. While individual chapters share a number of characteristics, each of 
them is distinct, with specific research questions, methods, data, and results relevant to a 
specific chapter and topic described in great detail. 
In this introduction I propose an overarching research question for my entire habilitation 
thesis, namely: what effects do tax havens have on other countries? And, more specifically, 
what are the negative effects of tax havens? In particular I focus on financial secrecy and 
corporate tax revenues. I therefore provide examples of how research described in 
individual chapters provides an answer to this general research question. In chapter 2 I 
quantify financial secrecy. In chapter 3 I argue that tax haven-related illicit financial flows, 
loosely defined as funds which are illegally earned, transferred or utilized, exert a negative 
influence on developing countries. The remaining chapters focus on the tax revenue effects 
of tax havens. In chapters 4 to 7 I provide estimates of profit shifting by MNEs into tax 
havens out of India and the Czech Republic. In chapters 8 to 10, I approximate the scale of 
various tax haven-associated effects related to profit shifting. All of the chapters thus 
contribute to answering the main research question, albeit from different angles, and 
support the general conclusions of my habilitation thesis. 
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Findings described in the nine chapters which comprise my habilitation thesis and in other 
existing research may be summed up in the form of three general conclusions. First, low 
taxation is not the only temptation of tax havens. Low tax rates are far from the only 
characteristic of tax havens which are attractive to foreign individuals and companies. 
Financial secrecy, i.e. the lack of financial transparency, is important and facilitates illicit 
financial outflows from other countries. Tax havens thus prevent other countries from 
receiving the appropriate benefits of their economic production and also lower tax revenues 
are available to their governments. While these financial effects are important, tax havens 
may also harm the institutions of other countries. By enabling tax avoidance or illegal 
activities, they can weaken the role of government and citizens’ willingness to pay taxes, 
undermine the morale of tax systems and the accountability of governments towards their 
citizens, lower investor confidence and harm the institutional environment in general. 
When tax havens are used to launder money used for corruption and bribery, they can help 
keep corrupt politicians and other elites in power, sustain criminal activities and hide 
criminal profits. I discuss these aspects of tax havens in chapter 3, while chapter 2 
highlights financial secrecy as an important attraction of tax havens. 
My second conclusion is that tax havens are not limited to small Caribbean islands. Some 
European countries and relatively big economies also constitute tax havens, or at least 
exhibit some important characteristics of tax havens. Lists of tax havens prepared by 
international organisations such as OECD (2013) and the European Commission (2015) 
have long been dominated by relatively small countries, while other countries – including 
several member countries of these international organisations – have rarely been listed. I 
have thus helped design and apply verifiable criteria for identifying tax havens. In chapter 
2 I identify Switzerland, Luxembourg and the United States as some of the biggest suppliers 
of financial secrecy and in chapter 8 I conclude that the Netherlands, Ireland, Bermuda and 
Luxembourg systematically attract a disproportionate amount of profit with respect to their 
economic activity. 
Finally, tax havens are associated with substantial tax revenue losses incurred by other 
countries’ governments. A discussion on the extent of tax revenue losses stemming from 
profit shifting is ongoing, with some researchers including e.g. Hines (2014) suggesting 
that these losses may not be exceedingly high. However, recent evidence seems to confirm 
that global annual tax revenue losses are indeed high, reaching hundreds of billions USD, 
as shown by economists such as Zucman (2014) or Clausing (2016) and international 
organisations such as OECD’s Johansson, et al. (2017) or IMF’s Crivelli et al. (2016). 
These estimates are also comparable to the current global expenditure on development 
assistance and thus can be seen as the order of magnitude of what FitzGerald (2013) calls 
the global public goods levy. Furthermore, according to some estimates the losses tend to 
be higher for developing countries relative to their GDP. I contribute to these tax revenue 
loss estimates in chapters 8 to 10 and include a brief comparison of some of the above cited 




Along with these three general conclusions, a number of more specific findings are 
included in the nine chapters, some of which are highlighted in the remaining part of the 
introduction.  
Chapter 2 of my habilitation thesis focuses on financial secrecy; the original paper is co-
authored with Alex Cobham and Markus Meinzer (Cobham et al. 2015) and I assess my 
contribution to be roughly 50 %. In this chapter I explore and implement a concept of 
secrecy jurisdiction and present the findings of the resulting Financial Secrecy Index. The 
index ranks countries according to their contribution to global financial flow opacity. It 
reflects both the specific choices made by countries and the potential importance of such 
choices for other countries. It captures both the intensity of the countries’ commitment to 
financial secrecy and their external scale. The empirical results reveal a geography of 
financial secrecy quite different from the popular image of small island tax havens still 
dominating popular perceptions and even some research literature. A number of secrecy-
supplying major economies are identified. Instead of providing a simplified binary division 
differentiating between tax havens and other countries, the results introduce a 
comprehensive secrecy spectrum which all countries may be assigned to. 
Though I have worked on research described in chapter 2 since 2009, the project remains 
ongoing, with the fifth version of the Financial Secrecy Index scheduled for publication in 
early 2018. In addition to improving the index itself, I am leading several follow-up 
research projects including the development of the Bilateral Financial Secrecy Index, 
designed to assess which secrecy jurisdictions are important for which countries, income 
groups and regions. This research focuses on European countries as both potential secrecy 
jurisdictions and as countries affected by them. We identify to what extent European 
countries are exposed to financial secrecy and which countries comprise the most 
significant secrecy jurisdictions in Europe. We encounter a high degree of heterogeneity 
across secrecy jurisdictions both in Europe and around the world. This new geography of 
financial secrecy has significant implications for policy recommendations and further 
research, especially as it also includes country-specific risk profiles. The research should 
thus point policy makers' limited resources and attention to the most relevant secrecy 
jurisdictions in individual countries. 
Research described in chapter 2 is relevant for all other chapters especially as it argues that 
the term tax haven is an ill-defined misnomer. The lack of clear and agreed definitions of 
tax havens in academic literature has contributed to important and systematic weaknesses 
in existing analyses carried out in fields including international economics, international 
political economy and economic geography. The most obvious problem stemming from 
this lack of clear-cut definitions is when the category of tax haven is taken for granted 
without an explicit definition or classification. Without clearly defined criteria stipulating 
how lists of tax havens have been derived, papers such as Hines and Rice (1994) or 
Johannesen and Zucman (2014) expose themselves to the risk of providing insufficiently 
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robust results. In spite of this criticism included in chapter 2, I acknowledge that some of 
my own chapters are to some extent vulnerable in this respect. Throughout all chapters I 
use the term tax haven as there is hardly a better general term which would sufficiently 
cover the entire breadth of my research from low tax rates to financial secrecy. 
Furthermore, methodologies utilized in chapters 4 and 10 are dependent on lists of countries 
classified as tax havens. Where possible, I have attempted to improve on this approach and 
thus to contribute to research conducted in this respect as well: In chapter 6 I study the 
effects of specific tax havens one by one, rather than as a group. In chapter 7 I empirically 
derive which countries seem to be behaving as tax havens. In chapter 8 I use alternative 
lists of tax havens as a robustness check. I believe that the approaches used in these three 
chapters should become more common in research, as should the usage of indicators similar 
to the one presented in chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 of my habilitation thesis, a sole-authored paper (Janský 2015), focuses on illicit 
financial flows from developing countries, what developed countries can do to diminish 
them and how to track their progress in doing so. Recent years have seen a growing degree 
of recognition of the harm caused by illicit financial flows and of the role of developed 
countries in providing an environment which tolerates these flows. In this chapter I explain 
why illicit financial flows should be reflected in the Center for Global Development’s 
Commitment to Development Index which ranks developed countries according to their 
contribution to developing countries in seven policy areas: aid, trade, migration, 
environment, security, technology and investment. I identify the most relevant illicit 
financial flow indicators and discuss their advantages and limitations and ultimately 
propose the inclusion of a qualitative component of the Financial Secrecy Index into the 
investment component of the Commitment to Development Index. This recommendation 
has been reflected in the index since 2013, following the chapter’s first publication as a 
working paper (Janský 2013). This chapter builds on my long-term interest in policy 
indices, reflected in my contribution to the estimation of the first results of the Commitment 
to Development Index for the Czech Republic (Janský and Řehořová 2013) as well as in 
my ongoing policy work associated with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development 
Goals. 
As the reduction of illicit financial flows is one of the targets of Sustainable Development 
Goals, the arguments of chapter 3 remain relevant. An ongoing discussion focuses on which 
indicators should be selected to track illicit financial flows included in target 16.4 (“By 
2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and 
return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”). I recently joined this 
discussion with a co-authored paper for the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Cobham & Janský, 2017b) which argues that such an indicator should reflect 
both illegal flows based on the theft of state assets and the proceeds of crime and legal 
illicit flows based on tax evasion and avoidance and regulatory abuse. We focuse on the 




financial secrecy which makes illicit financial flows possible and the illicit financial flows 
risk exposure that individual countries face. My research presented in this habilitation 
thesis supports some of these arguments and might thus, depending on what the United 
Nations and its member governments ultimately agree on, support the design of the 
Sustainable Development Goals target indicators. 
Chapter 4 of the habilitation thesis focuses on profit shifting out of developing countries 
and, in particular, India. The paper is co-authored with Alex Prats (Janský and Prats 2015) 
and I assess my contribution to be roughly 75 %. This chapter is one of my first 
contributions to the discussion on how international corporate tax avoidance may be 
capable of reducing tax revenue in developing countries. It is also my first empirical 
analysis using the detailed firm-level Burea van Dijk’s Orbis financial and ownership data. 
The methodology, largely based on Fuest and Riedel (2012), builds on the notion that 
MNEs differ in their ability to shift income out of their host countries. In the case of MNEs 
operating in India in 2010 the paper shows that the MNEs with links to tax havens reported 
lower profits and paid less taxes per unit of assets than MNEs with no such links. These 
observations are consistent with profit shifting.  
Chapter 4 was, at the time of its first publication as a working paper in 2013 (Janský and 
Prats 2013), one of the first firm-level analyses of profit shifting for a developing country. 
While some more recent studies of developing countries have exploited the detailed 
information included in the Orbis database (Johannesen et al. 2017), Orbis suffers from 
weak coverage of many developing countries and tax havens, as discussed by Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2015), Clausing (2016) or Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017). Thus, although I use 
firm-level data in chapters 4 to 6, I believe that country-level data with comparatively better 
coverage of developing countries may be useful in profit-shifting research. For example, 
while I use country-level foreign direct investment data in chapters 8 and 10, I use 
government revenue data in chapter 9. Therefore, in my future research I would like to use 
combinations of firm-level and country-level data. While much of my research focuses on 
developing countries, chapters 5, 6 and 7 are specifically dedicated to the Czech Republic. 
Chapter 5 of my habilitation thesis focuses on profit shifting out of the Czech Republic; the 
paper is co-authored with Ondřej Kokeš (Janský and Kokeš 2015) and I assess my 
contribution to be approximately 75 %. The paper strives to contribute to a growing body 
of systematic evidence of profit shifting by analysing the situation in the Czech Republic. 
The utilized empirical strategy and data source, i.e. Orbis, is similar to chapter 4. We 
present evidence suggesting that while the effect of MNEs’ links with tax havens on the 
debt ratio of companies in the Czech Republic is consistent with profit shifting, results 
regarding profits and taxes are not conclusive. This is to some extent consistent with profit 
shifting and especially with the debt shifting channel. While tax havens are considered as 
a group in this chapter, the next chapter describes an alternative approach. 
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Chapter 6 of my habilitation thesis focuses on profit shifting out of the Czech Republic to 
three specific European tax havens; the paper is co-authored with Ondřej Kokeš (Janský 
and Kokeš 2016) and I assess my contribution to be approximately 75 %. This chapter 
begins with an observation that most existing research, including my research presented in 
chapters 4 and 5, considers tax havens as a group. Chapter 6 deals with this shortcoming 
by considering individual tax havens separately and empirically testing whether or not 
ownership links with specific tax havens are associated with profit shifting. Once this 
approach is applied to the Czech Republic’s company-level Orbis data, results suggest that 
profits shift through debt financing from the Czech Republic to Luxembourg, Switzerland 
and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. We also provide rough estimates of the impact of 
this profit shifting on tax revenues for MNEs with links to the Netherlands. In this respect, 
we were among the few to do so on the basis of firm-level data analysis, especially since 
empirical studies conducted by other academics seldom include estimates of profit shifting 
to revenue effects. There are of course exceptions and their number is increasing over time, 
as reviewed in chapter 10. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) were an early exception; their 
estimates of tax revenue losses for European countries have, until recently, been rarely 
emulated. I provide such country-level tax revenue estimates for as many countries as 
possible in chapters 8, 9, and 10.  
Chapter 7 of my habilitation thesis, a sole-authored paper available as a working paper 
(Janský 2016) and forthcoming in Post-Communist Economies (Janský forthcoming), 
focuses on potential corporate income tax revenue loss in the Czech Republic due to 
international corporate tax avoidance and especially profit shifting. In order to quantify the 
loss, I first review existing estimates and subsequently provide several new – albeit merely 
illustrative – estimates, including those extrapolated for the Czech Republic from six 
international studies. In addition to concluding that reliable estimates for the Czech 
Republic are missing, I ascertain that the extrapolations are likely some of the more reliable 
estimates and that their median estimate of revenue loss stands at 10 % of current corporate 
income tax revenues. These findings support the case for the implementation of policy 
recommendations designed to deal effectively with international corporate tax avoidance. 
However, they also highlight the need for more research, both specifically tailored to the 
Czech Republic and with global outreach; this thus forms the focus of the next three 
chapters. 
Chapter 8 of my habilitation thesis estimates the misalignment between the location of 
economic activity carried out by MNEs in the United States and the location of their profits; 
the paper is co-authored with Alex Cobham (Cobham & Janský, 2017c) and I assess my 
contribution to be roughly 50 %. The paper has developed a new, straightforward method 
designed to measure what we have termed misalignment, with profit shifting likely 
responsible for a part of this phenomenon. For each country we have estimated 
misalignment as the amount of profit being reported outside of where economic activity 




MNEs. One of the advantages of our method is that we not only quantify how much money 
countries lose to tax havens, but also how much individual tax havens might be benefiting. 
We show that tax havens are of first-order importance for the world economy, with several 
countries with low average effective tax rates systematically attracting a disproportionate 
amount of profit with respect to their economic activity. The Netherlands, Ireland, 
Bermuda, Luxembourg, Singapore and Switzerland are responsible for the majority of 
misaligned profits at the expense of countries where the real economic activity in fact takes 
place. Overall, we estimate that as much as a quarter of the global profits of all US MNEs 
may be shifted to locations other than where the underlying real activity actually takes 
place. This estimate amounted to approximately USD 660 billion in 2012, i.e. almost 1 % 
of world GDP. Since US MNEs are responsible for approximately one fifth of global 
foreign direct investment, it is not inconceivable that the scale of profit shifting by all 
MNEs worldwide may be even higher than suggested by other existing estimates discussed 
in chapters 9 and 10.  
Chapter 9 of my habilitation thesis estimates the effects exerted by tax havens on the 
corporate tax revenues of other countries; the paper is co-authored with Alex Cobham 
(Cobham and Janský forthcoming) and I assess my contribution to be roughly 75 %. This 
chapter re-estimates the work of the International Monetary Fund’s Crivelli et al. (2016) 
and, to a large extent, confirms their findings. We find their results to be mostly robust to 
the use of different government revenue data, a different definition of tax havens and the 
use of average effective tax rates instead of statutory tax rates. Compared to the USD 650 
billion established by Crivelli et al., our preferred global estimate figure of international 
corporate tax avoidance stands at approximately USD 500 billion. Furthermore, we publish 
country-level revenue loss estimates, establishing that losses relative to GDP are 
substantially greater in low- and lower middle-income countries, specifically in sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. This appears to support two 
key conclusions: lower-income countries suffer more intensively from profit shifting and 
the substantial variations between countries warrant the close attention of policy makers to 
their specific situation. 
Chapter 10 of my habilitation thesis estimates the scale of profit shifting and tax revenue 
losses related to foreign direct investment; the paper, co-authored with Miroslav Palanský 
(Janský and Palanský 2017), is available as a working paper and is currently under 
consideration for publication in International Tax and Public Finance. I assess my 
contribution to be approximately 50 %. This final chapter attempts to point out which 
countries’ tax revenues are most affected by tax havens. While this research question is 
similar to the one posed in chapters 8 and 9, a different methodological approach based on 
foreign direct investment data is employed here. To estimate the scale of profit shifting, we 
start by observing that the higher the share of foreign direct investment from tax havens, 
the lower the reported rate of return on investment. Like the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development’s 2015 World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2015), we assume 
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that the reported rate of return is lower due to profit shifting. However, unlike the report, 
we also provide illustrative country-level estimates of profit shifting and improve the 
methodology in a number of aspects. We find that in terms of corporate tax revenue relative 
to their GDP, OECD member countries lose the least while lower-income countries lose 
the most. We compare our results with three other recent studies which use different 
methodologies to derive country-level estimates of tax revenue losses which may be related 
to profit shifting. Specifically, we make comparisons with estimates described in chapter 
8, 9 and with Clausing (2016). In the first such comparison made, we find that while every 
study identifies differences across income groups, the nature of these differences varies 
across the four included studies. Two of them have limited data for lower-income countries 
while the other two, i.e. chapters 9 and 10, show that these countries lose more corporate 
tax revenue relative to their GDP. 
In conclusion to this introductory chapter, I would like to offer a brief summary of some of 
the most important existing policy recommendations aimed at curtailing the negative 
effects of tax havens. All four below mentioned specific policy proposals are currently 
being discussed either by the EU, the OECD or by other international institutions. First, I 
would like to stress the importance of ensuring the availability of high-quality beneficial 
ownership information. This data should ideally be made publicly available so that 
information about the beneficial owner of any company would be available to anyone who 
requests it. Second, I support the full, global implementation of automatic exchange of tax 
information so that tax authorities are informed of their taxpayers’ income sources in other 
countries. Third, I would like to see the public country-by-country reporting for MNEs 
implemented so that companies have to report where their economic activities are 
conducted, where their profits are reported and where their taxed are paid. The fourth 
proposal addresses the flaws of the current system of international corporate taxation most 
substantially: I support the introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base for 
the EU and its consideration globally. Following this reform, each MNE would be 
considered a unitary business rather than a network of independently profit-maximising 
affiliates, as is the case under the current arms-length principle (Picciotto, 2017). The Czech 
Republic should aim to support international policy agreements which include these four 
specific policy proposals in order to thus improve the system of international corporate 
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